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Abstract
This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation, intended as
beliefs buyers hold about sellers reliability, in the context of the Kenyan rose
export sector. A model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and
tested. We show that 1) the value of the relationship increases with the age of
the relationship; 2) during an exogenous negative supply shock sellers prioritize
relationships consistently with the predictions of the model; and 3) reliability at
the time of the shock positively correlates with future survival and relationship
value. Models exclusively focussing on enforcement or insurance considerations
cannot account for the evidence.
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1 Introduction
Imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real-life commercial transac-
tions. In the absence of formal contract enforcement trading parties rely on informal
mechanisms to guarantee contractual performance (see, e.g., Johnson, McMillan and
Woodru¤ (2002), Greif (2005), Fafchamps (2006)). Among those mechanisms, long-
term relationships based on trust or reputation are perhaps the most widely studied
and have received substantial theoretical attention. The theoretical literature has de-
veloped a variety of models that capture salient features of real-life relationships, e.g.,
enforcement problems (see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomsom (1989), Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy (1994, 2002), Levin (2003)), insurance considerations (see, e.g., Thomas
and Worrall (1988)), or uncertainty over parties commitment to the relationship (see,
e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Watson (1999), Halac (2012)). While these di¤erent
models share the common insight that future rents are necessary to deter short-term
opportunism, they also di¤er in important respects. Empirical evidence on informal
relationships between rms, therefore, has the potential to identify which frictions are
most salient in a particular context. In turn, such knowledge can be benecial for
policy, particularly in a development context. Empirical progress in the area, however,
has been limited by the paucity of data on transactions between rms in environments
with limited or no formal contract enforcement and challenges in measuring future
rents and beliefs.
This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation, intended as beliefs
buyers hold about sellers reliability, in the context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A
survey we conducted among exporters in Kenya reveals that relationships with foreign
buyers are not governed by written contracts enforceable in courts. The perishable
nature of roses makes it impractical to write and enforce contracts on suppliers reli-
ability. Upon receiving the roses, the buyer could refuse payment and claim that the
roses did not arrive in the appropriate condition while the seller could always claim
otherwise. The resulting contractual imperfections, exacerbated by the international
nature of the transaction, imply that rms rely on repeated transactions to assure
contractual performance.
The analysis takes advantage of three features of this setting. First, unlike do-
mestic sales, all export sales are administratively recorded by customs. We use six
years of transaction-level data of all exports of roses from Kenya, including the names
of domestic sellers and foreign buyers, as well as information on units traded, prices
and date. Second, in the ower industry direct supply relationships coexist alongside
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a well-functioning spot market, the Dutch Auctions.1 If roses transacted in the rela-
tionships can be traded on the auctions, incentive compatibility considerations imply
that the spot market price can be used to compute a lower bound to the future value
of the relationship. Third, the reaction of the relationships to a negative exogenous
supply shock induced by the post-election violence in January 2008 provides a unique
opportunity to test the predictions of the reputation model and distinguish it from
alternative models.2
We rst present a model of the relationship between a rose producer (seller) and
a foreign buyer (buyer). The set up of the model matches qualitative features of the
market under consideration. A version of the model with no contract enforcement,
developed along the lines of the relational contracts literature, is analyzed rst. The
incentive compatibility constraints of the model clarify how information on quantities
transacted, prices in the relationships and auction prices, which are all observable in
the data, can be used to compute lower bounds to the value of the relationship for
the buyer and the seller. The model is then extended to consider uncertainty over the
sellers type and to examine how reputational forces inuence sellers reaction to the
negative shock.
We then test the predictions of the model. Measures of the value of the future
rents in the relationship for the buyers and the sellers are computed. The estimated
relationships values correlate positively with the age and past amount of trade in the
relationship. The results, which hold controlling for relationship (which include seller,
buyer and cohort), time and selection e¤ects, are inconsistent with the pure limited
enforcement version of the model but support the version with reputational dynamics.
At the time of the violence, exporters located in the region directly a¤ected by the
violence could not satisfy commitments with all buyers. The violence was a large shock
and exporters had to chose which buyers to prioritize. We document an inverted-U
shaped relationship between the age of the relationship with the buyers and the re-
liability in supply at the time of the violence. The demonstrated reliability at the
time of the violence correlates with relationships survival and future values, but less
1The Dutch, or clock, auction is named after the ower auctions in the Netherlands. In a
Dutch auction the auctioneer begins with a high asking price which is lowered until some participant
is willing to accept, and pay, the auctioneers price. This type of auction is convenient when it is
important to auction goods quickly, since a sale never requires more than one bid.
2Following heavily contested presidential elections in Kenya at the end of December 2007, several,
but not all, regions of the country plunged into intense episodes of ethnic violence. Flower exporters
located in regions where conict occurred suddenly found themselves lacking signicant proportions
of their labor force and su¤ered dramatic drop in exports. In Ksoll et al. (2013) we document that at
the average rm in the conict region 50% of the labor force was missing and exports volumes dropped
by 38% at the peak of the violence.
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so in older relationships. Both facts are predicted by the reputation model and are
not consistent with other models, e.g., those that exclusively focus on enforcement or
insurance considerations. We discuss the policy implications of these ndings, par-
ticularly from the point of view of export promotion in developing countries, in the
concluding section.
The ndings and methodology of the paper contribute to the empirical literature on
relationships between rms. McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) and Banerjee and Duo
(2000) are closely related contributions that share with the current paper a developing
country setting.3 In an environment characterized by the absence of formal contract
enforcement, McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) nd evidence consistent with long term
informal relationships facilitating trade credit. Banerjee and Duo (2000) infer the
importance of reputation by showing that a rms age strongly correlates with con-
tractual forms in the Indian software industry. Both McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999)
and Banerjee and Duo (2000) rely on cross-sectional survey evidence and cannot con-
trol for unobserved rm, or client, heterogeneity. In contrast, we exploit an exogenous
supply shock and rely on within relationship evidence to prove the existence, study
the source, and quantify the importance of the future rents necessary to enforce the
implicit contract. Antras and Foley (2012) and Macchiavello (2010) are two closely
related studies in an export context. Antras and Foley (2012) study the use of prepay-
ment to attenuate the risk of default by the importer. Using data from a U.S. based
exporter of frozen and refrigerated food products they nd that prepayment is more
common at the beginning of a relationship and with importers located in countries
with a weaker institutional environment. Macchiavello (2010), instead, focuses on the
implications of learning about new suppliers in the context of Chilean wine exports.
In the context of domestic markets, particularly for credit and agricultural products,
Fafchamps (2000, 2004, 2006) has documented the importance of informal relationships
3Banerjee and Munshi (2004), Andrabi et al. (2006), Munshi (2010) provide interesting studies
of contractual relationships in a development context, but with rather di¤erent focus. For example,
Munshi (2010) and Banerjee and Munshi (2004) provide evidence on the trade enhancing role of
long term relationships based on community ties. Andrabi et al. (2006) provide evidence of how
exible specialization attenuates hold-up problems. Hjort (2012) studies how ethnic divisions impact
productivity using data from a Kenyan ower plant. The literature on tied labour in rural contexts has
studied the connections existing between spot markets and informal relationships (see, e.g., Bardhan
(1983) and Mukherjee and Ray (1995)).
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between rms in Africa and elsewhere.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the industry,
its contractual practices, and the ethnic violence. Section 3 introduces the model
and derives testable predictions. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5
provides a discussion of the ndings. Sections 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks and
policy implications. Proofs, additional results and further information on the data are
relegated to an online Appendix.
2 Background
This section provides background information on the industry, its contractual prac-
tices and the ethnic violence. The section relies on information collected through a
representative survey of the Kenya ower industry conducted by the authors through
face-to-face interviews in the summer of 2008.
2.1 The Kenya Flower Industry
Over the last decade, Kenya has become one of the largest exporters of owers in the
world. The ower industry, one of the largest foreign-currency earners for the Kenyan
economy, counts around one hundred established exporters located at various clusters
in the country. Roses, the focus of this study, account for about 80% of exports of
cut owers from Kenya. Roses are a fragile and perishable commodity. To ensure
the supply of high-quality roses to distant markets, coordination along the supply
chain is crucial. Roses are hand-picked in the eld, kept in cool storage rooms at a
constant temperature for grading, then packed, transported to Nairobis international
airport in refrigerated trucks owned by rms, inspected and sent to overseas markets.
The industry is labor intensive and employs mostly low educated women in rural
areas. Workers receive training in harvesting, handling, grading, packing and acquire
skills which are di¢ cult to replace in the short-run. Because of both demand (e.g.
particular dates such as Valentines day and Mothers day) and supply factors (it is
4Alongside a larger literature that studies formal contracts between rms (see Lafontaine and Slade
(2009) for a survey), some studies have focused on the relationship between informal enforcement
mechanisms and formal contract choice (see, e.g., Corts and Singh (2004), Kalnins and Mayer (2004),
Lyons (2002), Gil and Marion (2010)). With the exception of Gil and Marion (2010), these papers
also rely on cross-sectional data and proxy the rents available in the relationship with product, rm,
or market characteristics that might a¤ect contractual outcomes in other ways.
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costly to produce roses in Europe during winter), oriculture is a seasonal business.
The business season begins in mid-August.
2.2 Contractual Practices
Roses are exported in two ways: they can be sold in the Netherlands at the Dutch
auctions or can be sold to direct buyers located in the Netherlands or elsewhere (in-
cluding Western Europe, Russia, Unites States, Japan and the Middle East). The
two marketing channels share the same logistic operations associated with exports,
but di¤er with respect to their contractual structure. The Dutch auctions are close
to the idealized Walrasian market described in textbooks. There are no contractual
obligations to deliver particular volumes or qualities of owers at any particular date.
Upon arrival in the Netherlands, a clearing agent transports the owers to the auc-
tions where they are inspected, graded and nally put on the auction clock. Buyers
bid for the roses accordingly to the protocol of a standard descending price Dutch auc-
tion. The corresponding payment is immediately transferred from the buyers account
to the auction houses and then to the exporter, after deduction of a commission for
the auctions and the clearing agent. Apart from consolidating demand and supply
of roses in the market, the Dutch Auctions act as a platform that provides contract
enforcement between buyers and sellers located in di¤erent countries: they certify the
quality of the roses sold and enforce payments from buyers to sellers. It is common
practice in the industry to keep open accounts at the auctions houses even for those
rms that sell their production almost exclusively through direct relationships. The
costs of maintaining an account are small, while the option value can be substantial.
Formal contract enforcement, in contrast, is missing in the direct relationships
between the ower exporter and the foreign buyer, typically a wholesaler. The export
nature of the transaction and the high perishability of roses makes it impossible to
write and enforce contracts on suppliers reliability. Upon receiving the roses, the buyer
could refuse payment and claim that the roses sent were not of the appropriate variety
and/or did not arrive in good condition. The seller could always claim otherwise.
Accordingly, exporters do not write complete contracts with foreign buyers.5
Exporters and foreign buyers negotiate a marketing plan at the beginning of the
5Among the surveyed 74 producers, only 32 had a written contract with their main buyer. When
a contract is written, it is highly incomplete. Among the 32 rms with a written contract, less than
a third had any written provision on the volumes, quality, and schedule at which owers have to be
delivered. Written contracts often include clauses for automatic renewal. Some rms report to have
had a written contract only in the rst year of their relationship with a particular buyer.
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season. With respect to volumes, the parties typically agree on some minimum volume
of orders year around to guarantee the seller a certain level of sales. Parties might,
however, agree to allow for a relatively large percentage (e.g., 20%) of orders to be
managed ad hoc. With respect to prices, most rms negotiate constant prices with
their main buyer throughout the year but some have prices changing twice a year,
possibly through a catalogue or price list. Prices are not indexed on quality nor on
prices prevailing at the Dutch auctions.
Contracts do not specify exclusivity clauses. In particular, contracts do not require
rms to sell all, or even a particular share, of their production to a buyer or to not sell
on the spot market. In principle, it would seem possible to write enforceable contracts
that prevent rms from side-selling roses at the auctions. The ability to sell on the spot
market, however, gives producers exibility to sell excess production as well as some
protection against buyers defaults and/or opportunism. Such contractual provisions
might not be desirable.
This paper takes the existence of direct relationships as given and does not explain
why relationships coexist along-side a spot-market.6 Beside lower freight and time
costs, a well-functioning relationship provide buyers and sellers with stability. Buy-
ers commitment to purchase pre-specied quantities of roses throughout the season
allows sellers to better plan production. Buyers value reliability in supply of roses
often sourced from di¤erent regions to be combined into bouquets. Parties trade-o¤
these benets with the costs of managing and nurturing direct relationships in an
environment lacking contract enforcement.
2.3 Electoral Violence
An intense episode of ethnic violence a¤ected several parts of Kenya following contested
presidential elections at the end of December 2007. The ethnic violence had two major
spikes lasting for a few days at the beginning and at the end of January 2008. The
regions in which rose producers are clustered were not all equally a¤ected. Only rms
located in the Rift Valley and in the Western Provinces were directly a¤ected by the
violence (see Figure 1).7 The main consequence of the violence was that rms located
in the regions a¤ected by the violence found themselves lacking signicant numbers
6Similar two-tier market structures have been documented in several markets in developing countries
(see Fafchamps (2006) for a review). The coexistence of direct relationships alongside spot markets is
also observed in several other contexts, such as perishable agricultural commodities, advertising and
diamonds. We are grateful to Jon Levin for pointing this to us.
7The classication of a¤ected and una¤ected regions is strongly supported by the survey conducted
in the summer following the crisis and is not controversial. See Appendix for details.
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of their workers. Among the 74 rms surveyed, 42 were located in regions that were
directly a¤ected by the violence. Table A1 shows that while rms located in regions
not a¤ected by the violence did not report any signicant absence among workers (1%,
on average), rms located in regions a¤ected by the violence reported an average of
50% of their labor force missing during the period of the violence. Furthermore, rms
were unable to completely replace workers. On average, rms in areas a¤ected by the
violence replaced around 5% of their missing workers with more than half of the rms
replacing none. Many rms paid higher over time wages to remaining workers in order
to minimize disruption in production.
With many workers missing, rms su¤ered large reductions in total output. Figure
2 plots deseasonalized export volumes around the period of the violence for the two
separate groups of rms. The Figure illustrates that the outbreak of the violence was
a large and negative shock to the quantity of roses exported by the rms in the conict
locations.
In the survey, we asked several questions about whether the violence had been
anticipated or not. Not a single rm among the 74 producers interviewed reported
to have anticipated the shock (and to have adjusted production or sales plans accord-
ingly): the violence has been a large, unanticipated and short-run negative shock to
the production function of rms.
2.4 Relationships Characteristics
Using the customs data, we build a dataset of relationships. Overall, we focus on the
period August 2004 to August 2009, i.e., ve entire seasons. The violence happened
in January 2008, i.e., in the middle of the fourth season in the data, which runs from
August 2007 to August 2008.
We dene the baseline sample of relationships as those links between an exporter
and a foreign buyer that were active in the period immediately before the violence. A
relationship is active if the two parties transacted at least twenty times in the twenty
weeks before the eruption of the violence. The data show clear spikes in the distribution
of shipments across relationships at one, two, three, four and six shipments per week in
the reference period. The cuto¤ is chosen to distinguish between relationships versus
sporadic orders. Results are robust to alternative cuto¤s.
In total, this gives 189 relationships in the baseline sample. Panel A in Table 1
reports summary statistics for the relationships in the baseline sample. The average
relationship had 60 shipments in the 20 weeks preceding the violence. The average
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age of the relationship in the sample, measured as the number of days from the rst
shipment observed in the data, is 860 days, i.e., two years and a half. Immediately
before the violence, contracting parties in the average relationship had transacted with
each other 298 times.8
Exporters specialize in one marketing channel alone. The majority of exporters
either sells more than 90% of produce through direct relationships, or through the
auctions. As a result, among the one hundred established exporters, only fty six
have at least one direct relationship with a foreign buyer in our baseline sample. On
average, therefore, exporters in the sample have three direct relationships (see Panel B
in Table 1). Similarly, there are seventy one buyers with at least a relationship in our
baseline. The average buyer, therefore, has about two and a half Kenyan suppliers.
Figures 3 and 4 document stylized facts that guide the formulation of the model.
Figure 3 shows that prices at the auctions are highly predictable. A regression of weekly
prices at the auction on week and season dummies explains 76% of the variation in
prices in the three seasons preceding the violence period. Figure 4 shows that prices
in relationships are more stable than prices at the auctions.
3 Theory
This section introduces a work horse model of the relationship between a ower pro-
ducer (seller) and a foreign buyer (buyer). The benchmark case with perfectly en-
forceable contracts is introduced rst. The assumption of enforceable contracts is
then relaxed. The model predicts stationary dynamics which are inconsistent with the
empirical evidence. An extension with uncertainty about sellers reliability is next in-
troduced. The extension matches the empirical evidence and is used to derive further
predictions on how sellers react to the violence. The section concludes with a summary
of testable implications.9
3.1 Set Up and First Best
Time is an innite sequence of periods t, t = 0; 1; :::The buyer and the seller have an
innite horizon and share a common discount factor  < 1: Periods alternate between
8These averages are left-censored, since they are computed from August 2004 onward. Since our
records begin in April 2004, we are able to distinguish relationships that were new in August 2004
from relationships that were active before. Among the 189 relationships in the baseline sample, 44%
are classied as censored, i.e., were already active before August 2004. This conrms the ndings of
the survey, in which several respondents reported to have had relationships longer than a decade.
9Section 5 discusses alternative modeling assumptions. All proofs are in the online Appendix.
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high seasons t = 0; 2; :::and low seasons t = 1; 3:::. Low season variables and parameters
are denoted with a lower bar (e.g., x). Similarly, high season variables are denoted
with a upper bar (e.g., x).
In each period, the seller can produce q units of roses at cost c(q) = cq
2
2 : The buyers
payo¤s from sourcing q units of roses from this particular seller is r(q) = v2q  v2 jq   qj :
The kink at q captures the buyers desire for reliability and, for simplicity, we assume
q = q = q.
There is also a market for roses where buyers and sellers can trade roses. The price
at which sellers can sell, pmt ; oscillates between p
m
t = p in high seasons and p
m
t = p < p
in low seasons: Let qm be the quantity of roses sold on the market and m be the sellers
optimal prots when she does not sell roses to the buyer. The buyer can purchase roses
in the market at price pbt = p
m
t + ; with  > 0 capturing additional transport and
intermediation cost.
Contracts are negotiated at the beginning of high seasons. Parties agree on constant
prices for the high season and the subsequent low season. The buyer has the ex-
ante bargaining power and o¤ers contracts at the beginning of the high season. With
constant prices, a contract in period t; then, is given by Ct =
n
qt; qt+1; wt
o
: A contract
species quantities to be delivered in the high season t when the contract is negotiated,
qt; in the following low season, qt+1; and a unit price to be paid upon delivery of roses,
wt; which is constant across seasons.10
We omit the period subscript t when this doesnt create confusion and assume:
Assumption 1:  > v > p > cq > p = 0:
With perfectly enforceable contracts the buyer o¤ers a contract C = q; q; w	 to
maximize her prots across two subsequent high and low season, i.e.,
(q; q; w) = r(q)  wq +   r(q)  wq (1)
subject to the seller participation constraint
wq + pqm   c (q + qm) +   wq + pqm   c(q + qm)  m + m: (2)
The sellers participation constraint takes into account her sales on the spot market:
for a given contract with the buyer; the seller sets qm and qm to maximize her prots.
10The buyer cannot write contracts which are contingent on the sellers sales on the market.
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Proposition 1: The buyer o¤ers C =
n
q; q; p+(c(q
)=q)
1+
o
: The seller accepts
and sets qm = pc   q and qm = 0.
The optimal contract displays i) lower seasonality in direct sales than in sales to
the spot market, and ii) price compression, i.e., p < w < p: Both features are observed
in the data. In a relationship with perfect contract enforcement the optimal contract
is repeated forever.
3.2 Limited Enforcement
As revealed by interviews in the eld, contracts enforcing the delivery of roses are not
available. This, potentially, generates two problems. First, the buyer might refuse to
pay the seller once the roses have been delivered. Second, given price compression, the
seller might fail to deliver the quantity of roses agreed with the buyer. Buyers and
sellers use relational contracts to overcome lack of enforcement.
A relational contract is a plan CR =
n
qt; qt+1; wt
o1
t=0;2;:::
that species quantities
to be delivered, qt and qt+1; and unit prices, wt; for all future high and low seasons.
Parties agree to break-up the relationship and obtain their outside options forever
following any deviation. The outside option of the seller is to sell on the market
forever and the outside option of the buyer is normalized to zero. The buyer o¤ers the
relational contract to maximize the discounted value of future prots
U
R
0 =
1X
t=0;2:::
t

(r (qt)  wtqt) + 

r

q
t+1

  wtqt+1

(3)
subject to incentive compatibility constraints and the sellers participation constraint.
Denote with URt and V
R
t the net present value of the payo¤s from the relationship
at time t for the buyer and the seller respectively. Let UOt and V
O
t denote the net
present value of the outside options. The buyer must prefer to pay the seller rather
than terminating the relationship, i.e.,

 
URt+1   UOt+1
  wt  qt for all t = 0; 2; ::: (4)
and


U
R
t+2   UOt+2

 wt  qt+1 for all t = 0; 2; ::: (5)
Similarly, the seller must prefer to produce and deliver the roses to the buyer rather
11
than optimally selling on the spot market, i.e.,

 
V Rt+1   V Ot+1
  (p  wt) qt for all for all t = 0; 2; ::: (6)
and


V
R
t+2   V Ot+2

  

wt  qt+1

+ c(q
t+1
) for all t = 0; 2; ::: (7)
The relational contract CR is chosen to maximize (3) subject to (4), (5), (6) and (7).11
Proposition 2: The optimal relational contract is such that qRt = q
R; qR
t+1
= qR
and wRt = w
R < p for all t = 0; 2; :::
The optimal relational contract is stationary. This is a well-known result (see, e.g.,
Abreu (1988) and Levin (2003)). The optimal relational contract also displays price
compression, i.e., wR < p: Price compression implies that (7) is never binding while
constraint (6) always is. Constraint (4) can, therefore, be rewritten as

 
SR
  p qR (8)
where SR = UR+V R V O is the value of the relationship. Lack of enforcement implies
that the amount of roses traded is constrained by the future value of the relationship.
The incentive constraints (4) and (6), combined into (8) illustrate how data on auction
prices p; relationships volumes qR and prices wR can be used to estimate lower bounds
to the value of the relationship to the buyer, the seller and as a whole. The quantitybS = pq provides a lower bound estimate of the value of the relationship. bS is the sum
of lower bound estimates of the value of the relationship for the seller bV = (p  w) q
and for the buyer bU = wq. The estimates bS; bV and bU are all directly observed in
the data. Together with the quantity of roses traded when incentive constraints are
more likely to bind, bQ = qR; these are the main outcomes of interest in the empirical
analysis. Future rents 
 
SR

do not depend on current auction prices. A binding (8),
therefore, implies an elasticity of qR with respect to p equal to minus one.
3.3 Sellers Hidden Types
Interviews in the eld suggest that concerns over a sellers reputation for reliability are
of paramount importance among buyers and sellers. First, delays and irregularity in
11Constraint (6) and the assumption that the sellers outside option is to sell forever on the market
imply that the sellers participation constraint is satised.
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rose deliveries are costly to the buyer. Second, the sector has expanded rapidly and
many sellers lack a previous record of success in export markets.12
We follow the literature and model reputation introducing uncertainty over types.13
There are two types of sellers: reliable and unreliable. A reliable seller has a discount
factor equal to : An unreliable seller, instead, receives shocks which makes her max-
imize her instantaneous payo¤. The probability of the shock, ; is known to both
parties and is constant over time. At the beginning of the relationship, the buyer
believes that the seller is reliable with probability 0:
Contract terms, trade outcomes and relationships length are not observed by other
market participants. The buyers outside option is the value of returning to the market
to be matched with a new seller of uncertain type. We focus on pooling contracts and
equilibria in which the buyer terminates the relationship if the seller is revealed to be
unreliable.
The buyer faces a choice between supply assurance and learning. The buyer can
o¤er an initial price wR0 = p and ensure delivery in all periods regardless of the sellers
type. A high price, however, is expensive and forces the buyer to trade relatively
low quantities of roses. Alternatively, the buyer can o¤er an initial price wR0 < p: A
lower price relaxes the buyers incentive constraint but exposes the buyer to the risk of
non-delivery. As before, the buyer pays rents to the seller in the low season. Delivery
failure, therefore, doesnt occur in the low season. However, a delivery failure still
occurs with probability (1  0) in the rst high season: Delivery in the high season
(but not in the low season), therefore, conveys positive information about the sellers
type. After  periods of successful delivery the buyer holds beliefs  () given by
 () =
0
0 + (1  0) (1  )b=2c
; (9)
with 0 () > 0 and 00 () < 0 (for su¢ ciently large ): Conditional on delivery in the
high season, the relationship is continued with positively updated beliefs about the
sellers type.
Proposition 3: Suppose (8) is binding at the beginning of the relationship. There
exists  such that for  <  the buyer experiments, i.e.: i) wRt < p for all t and ii)
12Buyers must, of course, also develop a reputation for respecting contracts. Relative to suppliers,
which are all clustered in a handful of locations, buyers are scattered in several destination countries.
Suppliers, therefore, can share information about cheating buyers more easily than buyers can share
information about cheating suppliers. As a result, uncertainty over a sellers reliability might be more
relevant than uncertainty over buyers reliability.
13See, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a survey. The formulation of types follows Araujo and
Ornelas (2010) and Antras and Foley (2012).
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qRt+2  qRt with a strict inequality for at least some initial t:
If  is su¢ ciently low, the buyer prefers to risk non-delivery and experiment. Since
surplus increases in beliefs,  () ; the optimal relational contract is non-stationary and
the quantity sourced in the high season, alongside with relationships value, increases
with relationshipsage.
3.4 The Violence
The violence hits the relationship in the middle of the high season (i.e., before the
unreliable type receives the shock to her discount rate). Consider a relationship of age
 : The seller is supposed to deliver quantity qR at price w
R
 : Because of the violence, the
seller can only deliver a share R 2 [0; 1] of qR : The share R depends on unobservable
e¤ort e  e and on other random factors. The cost of e¤ort is  (e):
Denote by eR and eU the buyers beliefs about the e¤ort exerted by the reliable
and unreliable types respectively: In the equilibrium: 1) given buyers beliefs, a reliable
seller sets eR and an unreliable seller sets e
U
 to maximize expected payo¤, and 2)
buyers beliefs are correct. As before, contracts, including adaptations of the relational
contract to information revealed at the time of the violence, are negotiated at the
beginning of the following high season.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3:
1)  0()  0;  00() > 0,  0(0) = 0 and lim
e!e
 0(e) =1:
2) R is drawn from a Beta distribution f(Rje) = Rae 1(1 R)a(e e) 1B(e;e;a) where a and e
are positive constants such that e  e and B() the appropriate Beta function:
The beta distribution is widely used to model the random behavior of percentages.
In our context, the beta distribution captures the intuition that higher e¤ort makes
high R more likely while imposing su¢ cient regularity to derive comparative statics
results. In particular, the Beta distribution implies i) E [Rje] = ee ; i.e., expected re-
liability is linear in e¤ort, ii) monotone likelihood ratio, i.e., relatively higher R is
a signal of relatively higher e¤ort, iii) higher e¤ort makes all states above a certain
threshold more likely and all states below less likely.
Proposition 4: Consider a relationship in which wR < p: In a separating equilib-
rium in which eR > e
U
 ; there exists a threshold eR > 0 such that if R < eR the seller
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doesnt deliver any rose to the buyer and the relationship is terminated. Moreover, if
qR and bV () = (p  w ) qR increase in  ; the (expected) share of roses transacted at
the time of the violence is increasing in relationships age  if   e :
In a separating equilibrium in which eR > e
U
 , a highR conveys positive information
about the sellers type. A su¢ ciently low R leads to beliefs that are too pessimistic
to sustain the relational contract. Anticipating this, the seller sells the available roses
on the spot market and the relationship ends. The last part of the proposition follows
from the trade-o¤ between the higher incentives provided by the desire to protect a
higher relationships value bV against the standard diminished reputational incentives
implied by su¢ ciently optimistic prior beliefs  .
Conditional on the survival of the relationship, i.e., R  eR ; the relational con-
tract is renegotiated at the beginning of the following high season. The new relational
contract is negotiated based on updated beliefs that depend on beliefs prior to the
violence,  () ; equilibrium e¤ort levels, eR and e
U
 ; and observed reliability R. These
updated beliefs, e  R; eR ; eU  ; induce relationship value S(e ) in the high season fol-
lowing the violence. The relationship value S(e ) is (weakly) increasing in e . Denoting
 (R) = f(RjeR )=f(RjeU ), the updated beliefs are given by
e  R; eR ; eU  =  (R) (R) + (1   ) : (10)
The e¤ect of reliability R on updated beliefs and, therefore, on relationships value
S(e ); is positive for all relationships age  and becomes negligible when prior beliefs
 are su¢ ciently optimistic:
3.5 Summary
The model provides the following three testable predictions:
Test 1: Consider outcomes by 2 f bQ; bS; bU; bV g: The pure limited enforcement model pre-
dicts no correlation between the age of the relationship,  ; and by: The reputation
model predicts a positive correlation between by and an increasing and concave
function of  :
Test 2: A binding aggregate incentive constraint (8) implies @ log
 bQ =@ log (p) =
 1:
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Test 3: The reputation model further predicts that: 1] Reliability at the time of the
violence, bR () ; is an (initially) increasing and (possibly) inverted-U shape func-
tion of an increasing and concave function of  ; 2] Conditional on age  and
survival, reliability at the time of the violence bR () positively correlates with
future outcomes by 2 f bQ; bS; bU; bV g in the relationship. The correlation is weaker
for older relationships.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Incentive Constraints and the Value of Relationships
The incentive compatibility constraints (4) and (6), aggregated into (8), provide lower
bounds to the value of the relationship for the buyer, the seller and the relationship as
a whole. We denote these lower bounds as U; V and S respectively. From an empirical
point of view, the appeal of the incentive constraints is that qRt ; p and w
R
t are directly
observable in the data. The computation of the lower bounds U , V and S; therefore,
does not rely on information on the cost structure of the rm, nor on expectations of
future trade between the parties, which are typically unobservable and/or di¢ cult to
estimate.
Recall that the model implies that only the maximum temptation to deviate has to
be considered to obtain an estimate of a lower bound to the value of the relationship.
For each relationship and season, therefore, we compute the lower bounds focusing on
the time in which the value of the roses on the market, qRt  p; is highest. In bringing
the constraint to the data, we need to choose a temptation window, i.e., the length of
the period of time during which the temptation is computed. For simplicity, we focus
on temptation windows of a week.14 Denote calendar weeks with ! and let qRi;t! be
the quantity traded in relationship i and pi;t! be auction prices in week ! of season
t: Using unit weight of roses transacted in relationship i, it is possible to use auction
prices for large and small roses to index pi;t! by relationship i: For each relationship i
in season t; dene week !it as the one with the largest aggregate temptation to deviate,
i.e.,
!it = arg max!

qRi;t!  pt!
	
: (11)
The lower bounds to the value of relationship i in season t, denoted by bSit; bUit and
14Results are robust to considering longer temptation windows.
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bVit; are given then by
bSit = qRi;t!it  pt!it ; (12)bUit = qRi;t!it  wi;t!it ; andbVit = qRi;t!it   pt!it   wi;t!it ;
where wi;t! denotes the price paid in relationship i in week ! of season t: Together
with bQit = qRi;t!it ; bSit; bUit and bVit are the main outcomes in the empirical specications.
The variation in the estimated values across time and relationships, therefore,
comes from di¤erent sources: i) the timing of the highest aggregate temptation, !it;
ii) quantities transacted during the relevant window, qRi;t!it ; iii) prices at the auc-
tion during the relevant window pt!it ; and iv) prices in the relationships during the
relevant window, wi;t!it : Within seasons, prices in relationships are quite stable, i.e.,
wi;t! ' wi;t: Conditional on unit weight of roses, prices at the auctions do not vary
across relationships.
Figure 5 reports the distribution of weeks !it in the sample used in Columns 1,3,5
and 7 of Table 2. The week of Valentines day is !it in about 40% of relationships.
Other prominent weeks are around Mothers days, which typically fall in March (e.g.,
UK, Russia, Japan) or later in May (e.g., other European countries and U.S.) depend-
ing on the country. Since prices at the auctions are predictable (see Figure 3), the
estimated values are not driven by unexpectedly high prices.
For the 189 relationships in the baseline sample, Panel C in Table 1 shows that
the aggregate value of the relationship bS in the season that preceded the violence was
578% of the average weekly revenues in the average relationship. The values for the
buyer bU and seller bV respectively are 387% and 191% of average weekly revenues.15
4.2 Test 1: Relationships Outcomes and Age
Figure 6 plots the distribution of the estimated bSit (in logs) for three di¤erent samples
of relationships in the season before the violence: relationships in the baseline sample
that were active at the Valentine day peak of the season prior to the violence; relation-
ships in the baseline sample that were not active during the Valentine day peak of the
15Under free-entry, initial sunk investments dissipate the ex-post rents generated by the relationship
(see, e.g., Shapiro (1983)). The estimates yield a lower bound to the xed costs of starting a relationship
and can be compared to structural estimates of xed costs of exporting. Das et al. (2007) report that
in the Colombian chemicals industry, xed costs of exports in each year represent 1% of the export
revenues of the rm. The corresponding gure for the initial sunk costs is between 18 to 42%. Our
estimates are a conservative lower bound since we focus on a temptation window of one week.
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season prior to the violence; and relationships that were active during the Valentine
day peak of the season prior to the violence but that are not in the baseline sample
since they did not survive until the violence period. Figure 6 shows two patterns: i)
relationships that have survived have higher values than relationships that did not; ii)
young relationships had lower values than established relationships.
The latter observation, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence that the value
of a relationship increases with age. Mechanically, the estimated value of a relationship
that is too young to have gone through a seasonal peak is low. Table 2 presents corre-
lation patterns between relationship age and the four outcomes of interest bQit; bSit; bUit
and bVit: Equation (9) in the theory section shows that beliefs about the sellers type
are an increasing and (eventually) concave function of the past number of shipments in
which prices at the auctions were higher than prices in the relationship. Accordingly,
we measure age of the relationship as the log of the number of past shipments during
which prices at the auctions were higher than prices in the relationship and denote
this variable as log(NTit): For all outcomes y 2 fQ;S;U; V g odd numbered columns
in Table 2 report results that exploit cross-sectional variation in the season before the
violence, i.e.,
log (byfb) = f + b +  log (NTfb) + "fb; (13)
where f and b are exporter and buyer xed e¤ects respectively and "fb is an error
term. The regression is estimated in the sample of relationships that were active in
the season before the violence.
From a cross-section it is not possible to disentangle age and cohort e¤ects. The
inclusion of buyer and seller xed e¤ects controls for cohort e¤ects at the contractual-
party level, but does not control for relationship cohort e¤ects, i.e., the fact that more
valuable relationships might have started earlier. Even numbered columns in Table
2, therefore, present results from an alternative specication that exploits the time
variation across seasons. This allows to include relationship xed e¤ects that control
for time-invariant relationship characteristics, including cohort e¤ects. Normally, even
with panel data it is not possible to separately identify age, cohort and season e¤ects
since, given a cohort, age and seasons would be collinear. However, our measure of
the age of the relationship, log (NTfb) ; is a non-linear function of calendar time and,
therefore, allows us to include season xed e¤ects, i.e.,
log (byfbt) = fb + t +  log (NTfbt) + "fbt; (14)
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where fb are relationship xed e¤ects, t season xed e¤ects and "fbt is an error term.
The selection e¤ect documented in Figure 6 could induce a spurious positive correla-
tion. The specication is therefore estimated on a balanced sample of relationships
that where active in all three seasons prior to the violence.
Results in Table 2 indicate a strong, positive, correlation between relationships age
and outcomes. Regardless of whether cross-sectional or time variation are used, the
age of the relationship positively correlates with i) volumes traded at the time of the
highest temptation bQit (columns 1 and 2), ii) the aggregate value of the relationshipbSit (columns 3 and 4), iii) the value of the relationship for the buyer bUit (columns 5
and 6) and iv) for the seller bVit (columns 7 and 8).16
4.3 Test 2: Binding Incentive Constraint
The results in Table 2 reject the predictions of the pure enforcement model. The results
are potentially consistent with the reputation model. The reputation model implies
the dynamics found in the data when the incentive constraint (8) is binding. Table 3
provides evidence suggesting that constraint (8) is binding in many relationships.
The logic for testing whether (8) is binding is as follows. In the model, the future
value of the relationship, bSit; does not depend on current auction prices. If (8) is
binding, therefore, a small increase in prices at the auctions should lead to a corre-
sponding decrease in the quantity bQit: Table 3 reports correlations between prices at
the auctions and relationships value bSit (column 1) and quantities bQit (column 2) in
the week of the highest temptation to deviate. In practice, relationships value might
depend on expectations of future prices at the auctions. Figure 3 shows that seasonal
variation in auction prices is highly predictable. Controlling for season and seasonality
xed e¤ects, therefore, should account for parties expectations about future auction
prices. Seasonality xed e¤ects are accounted for by including dummies for the week of
the season during which the highest temptation to deviate occurs. The combination of
season and seasonality e¤ects implies that variation in prices at the auctions captures
small unanticipated variation around the expected prices.
Table 3 shows that higher prices at the auctions lead to a proportional reduction in
16The results in Table 2 are extremely robust to a variety of di¤erent assumptions and specications.
In particular: 1) outcomes bQit; bSit; bUit and bVit and age can be measured in levels, instead of logs; 2)
age can also be measured as the number of previous shipments, or the calendar time from the rst
shipment in the relationship; 3) relationships for which estimated bVit are negative can also be included
(assigning them value of zero); 4) relationship controls, including week of maximum temptation to
deviate !fb dummies, can be included; and 5) we do not nd evidence of any di¤erence in results
between relationships in the conict and no-conict regions. Results are available upon request.
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quantity traded (column 2) and that, as a result, the aggregate value of roses traded
remains constant (column 1). The estimated elasticity between bQit and auction prices
is equal to ( 0:884); which is very close (and not statistically di¤erent from) to the
( 1) implied by a binding (8). Increasing prices paid to the seller does not help relaxing
the aggregate incentive constraint (8) since a reduction in the sellers temptation to
deviate is compensated by an equal increase in the buyers temptation. Column (3)
shows that prices at the auctions do not lead to higher prices in the relationship.17
Taken together, the evidence is consistent with information from interviews suggesting
that parties often agree to allow for a percentage (e.g., 20%) of orders to be managed
ad hocand avoid price renegotiations during the season.
4.4 Test 3: Predictions of the Reputation Model
Reliability at the Time of the Violence
This section provides further empirical tests of the predictions of the reputation
model by examining how relationships reacted to the violence. We exploit the regu-
larity of shipments within relationships to construct a counterfactual measure of the
volumes of roses that should have been exported in a particular relationship during
the time of the violence, had the violence not occurred. For each relationship in the
baseline sample, we separately estimate a model that predicts shipments of roses in a
particular day. The model includes shipments in the same day of the week the previous
week, total shipments in the previous week, week and season xed e¤ects as regressors.
For each relationship, we obtain a predicted shipment of roses on a particular day. We
aggregate these predicted value at the week level. The model predicts more than 80%
of both in and out of sample variation in weekly shipments for the median relationship
in the sample.
Denote by yfb the observed shipments of roses in the relationship between rm
f and buyer b during the week of the violence, and by byfb the predicted shipments
of roses in the same relationship, obtained using the observed shipments in the week
immediately before the violence and the coe¢ cients from the relationship specic model
17Figure 7 provides further evidence that parties adjust to unanticipated uctuations in auctions
prices. The Figure shows that number of relationships ending in a given week does not correlate with
price at the auctions in that week during the seasons preceding the violence period. Regardless of
whether week dummies are controlled for or not, the level of prices at the auctions does not predict
the number of relationships ending.
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described above. Reliability at the time of the violence is given by
bRfb = yfbbyfb : (15)
Table 4 shows that the violence reduced reliability bRfb. Table 4 reports results
from the regression
log bRfb = b +   IC=1f + Zfb + Xf + "fb; (16)
where IC=1f is an indicator function that takes value equal to one if rm f is located in
the region a¤ected by the violence and zero otherwise; Xf is a vector of rm controls,
Zfb is a vector of relationship controls, and b are buyer xed e¤ects. Relation-
ship controls are age and the number of shipments, average price and volumes in the
twenty weeks preceding the violence. Seller controls are size (in hectares of land under
greenhouses), fair trade certication, age of the rm, membership in main business
association and ownership dummies (foreign, domestic Indian, indigenous Kenyan).
The reliability measure bRfb is a deviation from a relationships-specic counterfactual
that accounts for relationship-specic average and seasonal uctuations in exports.
The controls included in specication (16), then, allow the violence period to have
a¤ected export volumes in a particular relationship di¤erentially across buyers, sellers
and relationship characteristics.18
Table 4 shows that the violence reduced reliability. The Table reports results
using di¤erent empirical specications that di¤er in the number of controls included.
In column 4, which controls for buyer xed e¤ects as well as rm and relationship
controls, reliability was almost 20% lower, on average, in relationships of rms located
in the conict region.19
Reliability and Relationships Age
Given the positive correlation between relationship age and value for the seller
found in Table 2, the reputation model predicts that sellers in older relationships have
stronger incentives to exert e¤ort during the violence and deliver roses to the buyers.
18The results from specication (16), therefore, are equivalent to those of a regression of volumes of
exports eyfbs at time  in season s; on relationship-specic seasonality and season xed e¤ects, fb
and fbs; in which the e¤ects of the violence are recovered from an interaction between a dummy
for the period of the violence, vs; and a dummy for the conict region, cf , after controlling for the
interactions between vs and seller, buyer and relationship characteristics.
19The use of logs minimizes outliers. Results are robust to using the level of reliability: For instance,
the specication corresponding to column 4 yields a coe¢ cient of  0:316 with associated p-value 0:07:
Results are available upon request.
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On the other hand, in very old relationships, relatively little uncertainty might be left
regarding the sellers type. In those cases, even low delivery would not lead to overly
pessimistic beliefs about the sellers type. The model, therefore, predicts a (initially)
positive and, potentially, inverted-U relationship between reliability and age.
Table 5 reports results from the regression
log bRfb = b + f + 1 log (NTfb) + 2 [log (NTfb)]2 + Zfb + "fb (17)
where b are buyer xed e¤ects and Zfb are relationship controls described above. This
specication is very similar to equation (16), but note that it now includes rm xed
e¤ects f : We are interested in comparing how rms responded di¤erentially across
relationships. Given that rms in the violence region faced very di¤erent conditions,
we include rm xed e¤ects and estimate regression (17) separately on the sample of
rms located in the two regions.
Columns 1 and 2 provide results from relationships in the conict region. Column 1
shows that older relationships have higher reliability. Column 2 includes the measure
of age squared and nds patterns consistent with an inverted-U shape relationship
between age and reliability. The estimated coe¢ cients give  b1=2b2 ' 5:35: This
ratio implies approximately one third of relationships in the conict region for which
higher age correlates with lower reliability. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the exercise on
the sample of relationships from the no-conict region and fails to nd any evidence
of a relationship between age and reliability.20 ;21
Reliability and Relationships Survival
The model predicts that reliability at the time of the violence correlates with sub-
sequent outcomes in the relationships. We focus on the period starting from the
beginning of the season following the violence, i.e., after mid August 2008. This is the
period in which buyers and sellers (re-)negotiate the relational contract for the new
season.
20Results are robust to a number of alternative specications. In particular: 1) when age is measured
with the log of the number of past shipment b1 = 0:93 (p-value 0.001) and b2 =  0:08 (p-value
0.021) in the conict region; 2) when the level of bRfb is used results give b1 = 0:86 (p-value 0.007)
and b2 =  0:07 (with p-value 0.141) in the conict region; 3) a specication pooling both regions
nds similar results, with lower precision depending on the set of interactions included. In all cases
 b1=2b2 ' 5 in the conict region while no statistically signicant pattern is found in the no-conict
region. Results are available upon request.
21The model implies a minimum level of reliability eR > 0: any delivery below the threshold leads to
beliefs which are too pessimistic for the relationship to be continued. Consistently with the implication
of the model, the minimum level of observed reliability in the conict region is around 30%.
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More relationships did not survive to the following season in the conict region (16
out of 94, i.e., 17%) than in the no-conict region (8 out of 95, i.e., 8.5%). The di¤er-
ence in survival rate is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. Table 6 explores
the relationship between reliability, age and relationship survival in the two regions
separately. In the conict region (columns 1 and 2) reliability positively correlates
with relationships survival. No such relationship is found in the no-conict region
(columns 3 and 4).22Since relationships value and reliability increase with age (Table
2 and Table 5 respectively), Table 6 implies that the violence destroyed relatively less
valuable relationships in the conict region.
Relationship Outcomes Conditional on Survival
Table 7 reports results on the four outcomes bQit; bSit; bUit and bVit in the season
following the violence. The model predicts that higher reliability correlates with bet-
ter outcomes and that the strength of these relationship should be smaller for older
relationships. For all outcomes y 2 fQ;S;U; V g, the Table reports results from the
specication
log (byfb) = f+b+1 log  bRfb+2 log (NTfb)+3 log  bRfblog (NTfb)+Zfb+"fb;
(18)
where, as before, f and b are seller and buyer xed e¤ects, logNTfb is the preferred
measure of age before the violence, bRfb is reliability at the time of the violence, Zfb
are relationship controls, and "fb is an error term. All independent variables, including
controls, measure relationship characteristics prior to the violence. The model predicts
1 > 0; 2 > 0 and 3 < 0:
Panel A in Table 7 considers the conict region. For all four outcomes, results
indicate that higher reliability correlates with higher future outcomes in the relation-
ship, i.e., 1 > 0: Similarly, age at the time of the violence, measured by log (NTfb) ;
positively correlates with outcomes bQ, bS and bU (though not bV ): The interaction be-
tween age and reliability at the time of the violence is always negative and statistically
signicant, i.e., 3 < 0. Consistently with the predictions of the model, reliability at
the time of the violence translated into better outcomes in younger relationships. For
all four outcomes, the Panel B fails to nd any systematic pattern in the no conict
22The Table reports results from two di¤erent specications: with and without sellers controls and
buyer xed e¤ects. Results are robust to alternative specications, including i) considering the level
of reliability instead of log; ii) and a pooled regression of the two regions. The inclusions of seller
xed e¤ects reduces the precision of the estimates, but not their economic interpretation. Results are
available upon request.
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region.23
4.5 E¤ort at the Time of the Violence
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix provide evidence that rms exerted e¤ort during
the violence, as assumed in the model. Two margins of e¤ort are considered. Fig-
ure A1 in the Appendix shows that at the time of the violence prices in most direct
relationships were lower than prices on the spot market. Table A2 in the Appendix
shows that, despite higher prices at the auctions, export volumes to the spot market
dropped signicantly more than export volumes to direct buyers. This di¤erential re-
sponse holds controlling for seller xed e¤ects, i.e., comparing sales to the two channels
within the same rm. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that rms that specialize in
selling to direct buyers retained higher percentages of their workers during the vio-
lence.24 Firms could retain workers by, e.g., setting up camps on or around the farm
for workers threatened by the violence and paying higher wages to compensate over
time for workers that were still working on the farm. The correlation holds controlling
for characteristics of the rms labor force (education, gender, ethnicity, contract type
and housing programs), as well as rm characteristics (ownership type, certications
and land size). In sum, we nd evidence that rms exerted e¤orts along at least two
margins to respond to the violence.
5 Discussion
The evidence strongly supports the predictions of the reputation model: i) relationship
dynamics are non-stationary (Test 1), ii) the aggregate incentive constraint (8) appears
to be binding in many relationships (Test 2) and iii) the reaction to the violence are
consistent with further predictions of the reputation model (Test 3), e.g., the non-
linear relationship between age and reliability and the long-run e¤ects of reliability.
Before concluding, several points are worth discussing. We rst consider the role of
unobserved rose characteristics and then discuss some of the key assumptions of the
model and how the evidence relates to alternative theoretical models.
23Results in Table 7 are qualitatively similar in a number of alternative specications. In particular,
1) the use of reliability in level (instead of log); 2) a pooled regression gives similar results with lower
statistical signicance on outcomes bQ and bS; 3) results are stronger when using levels of outcome
variables. Results are available upon request.
24The Table also appears in Ksoll et al. (2013).
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5.1 Unobserved Rose Characteristics
The value of a rose mainly depends on i) its size, which we can proxy with unit weights
reported in the customs data, and ii) its variety which, unfortunately, is not reported.
Unobserved characteristics of roses present two main concerns for our results. A rst
concern regards the sellers incentive constraint (6) and its empirical implementation
in (12). To estimate the lower bound to the value of the relationship we assumed
that the roses can be sold at the auctions. A violation of the assumption introduces
measurement error. The auctions are an extremely liquid market in which hundreds of
rose varieties are traded each day. Conversations with practitioners suggest that the
assumption is likely to be valid in most cases. Still, it is possible that for some rela-
tionships the assumption is violated at the time of the highest temptation to deviate.
Three aspects of the empirical results are somewhat reassuring regarding the impor-
tance of this source of measurement error. First, Table A4 in the Appendix shows
that, within rms, there is no di¤erence in the average and standard deviation of unit
weights sold to direct buyers and to the auctions. Second, the predictions of the model
hold for two outcome variables, bQ and bU; that do not directly depend on prices at the
auctions. Third, the evidence of a binding incentive constraint (8) in Table 3 suggests
that side-selling to the auction is the relevant deviation in most relationships.
A second concern is that rms might export to di¤erent buyers varieties of roses
that are di¤erentially a¤ected by the violence (e.g., more labour intensive or perishable
varieties). If those rose characteristics correlate with the age of the relationship, the
results in Table 2 might be biased. Table A4 shows that average and standard deviation
of unit weights do not correlate with the age of the relationship. Further (unreported)
results show that average and standard deviation of unit weights do not change with
season and at the time of the violence within relationships. To the extent that data
allow, we do not nd evidence that unobserved rose characteristics pose a threat to
our results.
5.2 Assumptions in the Model
Motivated by interviews in the eld, we assumed that contracts are negotiated at
the beginning of the high season and that prices are constant across seasons. The
complexity associated with indexing contracts on weekly auction prices, the inability
of sellers and courts to observe the quality of roses delivered and a desire to smooth
seasonality in income proles are likely forces behind the use of constant prices. We
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abstract from these forces and take constant prices as a fact of commercial life in our
environment. If prices varied across seasons, the qualitative insights of the benchmark
and pure enforcement model would be una¤ected. The analysis of the model with
types, however, would require a di¤erent formulation of types and would become more
involved.
A second assumption is that outside options do not change over time. The assump-
tion is justied by the fact that outside options are likely to be functions of sellers
specic, rather than relationships specic, variables that evolve over time. The em-
pirical analysis controls for sellers xed e¤ects, e¤ectively comparing relationships
holding constant sellers specic factors that could determine outside options.
We have focused our attention on pooling contracts. In models with dynamic
adverse selection it is possible, but potentially very costly, to screen types (see, e.g.,
La¤ont and Tirole (1988)). In our model, both types receive the same pay-o¤ which
is equivalent to their outside option. Screening, therefore, would require paying future
rents to the reliable type. The buyers incentive constraint, however, places limits
on future payments to the seller potentially limiting the availability of separating
contracts.
We have assumed that, following the violence, contracts are renegotiated at the
beginning of the following high season. The assumption simplies the denition of
the Bayesian equilibrium following the violence and the derivation of the results in
Proposition 4. The unforeseen nature of the shock, the distance between buyers and
sellers and the need for a prompt response make the assumption appealing from an
empirical point of view as well.
5.3 Informal Insurance
Insurance considerations could also be important determinants of the value of rela-
tionships in this context.25 Informal insurance models also predict non-stationary
outcomes: past realizations of shocks inuence future continuation values. Because
past realization of shocks are unobservable it is di¢ cult to reject informal insurance
models. The results, however, suggest that insurance considerations are unlikely to
be driving how relationships reacted to the violence. First, insurance models predict
that relationships with higher promised value should give more slack to the seller. The
evidence suggests the opposite is true: older, and more valuable, relationships tend to
25While seasonal uctutations in market prices are predictable, buyers and sellers might be subject
to idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks.
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have higher reliability. Second, insurance considerations imply the use of both current
transfers and future values to provide incentives. In contrast, Figure A2 in the Appen-
dix shows that the distribution of prices at the time of the violence is very similar to
its counterpart in the twenty weeks before the violence. Prices were not renegotiated
upward at the time of the violence.
5.4 Alternative Modeling Assumptions
Levin (2003) extended the relational contracts literature (see, e.g., MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1989), Baker et al. (1994, 2002)) to the case of moral hazard and adverse
selection with i.i.d. types over time. Under both scenarios, provided that i) parties
are risk-neutral and have access to monetary transfers, and ii) the buyers actions are
perfectly observable; the (constrained) optimal relational contract is stationary. The
evidence, therefore, rejects extensions of the baseline model entirely based on this type
of asymmetric information.
Other modeling assumptions, however, imply non-stationary outcomes without as-
suming learning. When there is moral hazard and the buyer privately observes the
quality of the roses delivered stationary contracts are no longer optimal. Levin (2003)
and Fuchs (2007), however, show that the optimal contract is a termination contract
in which trade between parties continues in a stationary fashion provided performance
is above a certain threshold during a certain period of time. If performance falls below
the threshold, the relationship ends. The evidence is, therefore, also inconsistent with
this extension of the model.
Halac (2012) and Yang (2012) also study relational contract models with types. In
a model with binary e¤ort and output, Yang (2012) assumes that agents have di¤erent
productivity and obtains non-stationary outcomes. Halac (2012), instead, assumes
that either party has private information about her outside option and also obtains
non-stationary outcomes. In the special case in which the buyer has the bargaining
power and the seller has private information, however, the model predicts stationary
outcomes.26
26Learning models with symmetric information about the sellers type also predict non-stationary
outcomes. To account for the evidence, a learning model would have to assume that delivery at the
time of the violence provides an informative signal of the sellers type. In the model with types,
instead, delivery at the time of the violence endogenously reveals information about the sellers type
through an e¤ort decision. Given the unusual circumstances induced by the violence, the model with
types appeared to be more natural.
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6 Conclusion
Imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real-life commercial trans-
actions. In the absence of formal contract enforcement trading parties rely on the
future rents associated with long term relationships to deter short-term opportunism
and facilitate trade. Empirical evidence on the structure of informal arrangements in
supply relationships between rms has the potential to identify salient microeconomic
frictions in specic contexts and inform policy, particularly in a development context.
This paper presents an empirical study of supply relationships in the Kenya rose ex-
port sector, a context particularly well-suited to study informal relationships between
rms.
We nd evidence consistent with models in which sellers value acquiring and main-
taining a reputation for reliability. From a policy perspective, it is important to know
whether learning and reputation are important determinants of rmssuccess in ex-
port markets. Firms might have to operate at initial losses in order to acquire a good
reputation. Furthermore, if reputation is an important determinant of contractual
outcomes, prior beliefs about sellers a¤ect buyers willingness to trade, at least for a
while. This generates externalities across sellers and over time, justifying commonly
observed institutions such as certications, business associations and subsidies to joint
marketing activities.
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7 Online Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Assumption  > v implies that the buyer never purchases roses in the market.
Assumption v > p implies that the buyers willingness to pay is higher than market
prices in both seasons. As a result, the buyer o¤ers q = q = q: Assumption p = 0 is
made for convenience alone, and implies qm = 0: Assumption cq < p implies that the
marginal cost of producing q is smaller than the price in the market in the high season
and, therefore, qm = pc   q: The price w is set by the buyer and, following standard
arguments, can be recovered from the binding participation constraint. Simple algebra
gives w = p+(c(q
)=q)
1+ :
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof that the constrained optimal relational contract is stationary and, there-
fore, qRt = q
R and qR
t+1
= qR for all t = 0; 2:::follows standard arguments (e.g., Abreu
(1988) and Levin (2003)) and is omitted. The logic of the proof is that with risk neutral
parties and publicly observed history there is no need to distort future continuation
values to provide incentives.
Suppose instead that wR = p: Obviously, qR < q and cq > p implies that sellers
prots in the low season are strictly positive, R = wRqR   c(qR) > 0: In contrast,
prots in the high season in the relationships are equal to prots in the spot market,
since wR = p: The buyer could, therefore, lower the price by a small amount "; still
satisfy sellers constraints (6) and (7) and increase prots. Increasing prots at any
date only helps satisfying buyers constraints (4) and (5). A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider rst the strategy that delivers supply assurance. Suppose the buyer de-
cides to pay wsa0 = p, i.e., she does not experiment in the rst period. Then, delivery
of roses does not lead to any belief updating. If it is optimal not to learn in the rst
period, then it is also not optimal to learn in future periods as well. The contract is
then stationary and since (4) is assumed to be binding in the rst period, it will be
binding forever. The net present value of the relationship for the buyer at time zero is
then given by U
sa
0 = r(q
sa
0 ) wsa0 qsa0 + U sa1 : Using the binding constraint and UO1 = 0
this can be rewritten as U
sa
0 = r(q
sa
0 ): Recall that q
sa
0 is determined as the (unique)
solution to maximizing U
sa
0 subject to (4) when paying w
sa
0 = p.
Consider now the experimentation strategy in which we0 < p: Denote with e0 =
0 + (1  0) (1  ) : The net present value of the strategy at the beginning of the
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relationship is given by U
e
0 =
e0 (r(qe0)  we0qe0) 1  e0 v2q+U e1: Using the binding
constraint and UO1 = 0 this can be rewritten as U
e
0 =
e0r(qe0) 1  e0  v2q   we0qe0 :
Recall that qe0 is determined as the (unique) solution to maximizing U
e
0 subject to (4)
when paying we0 < p.
Under experimentation, decreasing  increases the continuation value, relaxes (4)
and increases qe0: U
e
0 is therefore monotonically decreasing in : Consider now the case
in which  ! 0; i.e., the likelihood of a delivery failure is arbitrarily small. Then
U
e
0 ! r(qe0): Since we0 < wsa0 ; binding (4) implies qe0 > qsa0 and, therefore, U e0 > U sa0 :
Since surplus increases in beliefs, when the buyer experiments in the rst period
she keeps experimenting in subsequent periods until (8) is not binding anymore. The
dynamic implications stated in the proposition then simply follows from the bind-
ing aggregate constraint and the fact that aggregate surplus is increasing in updated
beliefs.
Proof of Proposition 4
First note that the Beta distribution satises the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR),
i.e., for all eH > eL; (R) = f(RjeH)=f(RjeL) is strictly increasing in R: This implies
that low reliability is interpreted by the buyer as a signal of relatively lower e¤ort.
Moreover, lim
R!0
(R) = 0 and lim
R!1
(R) =1:
Suppose the buyer believes that eR > e
U
 : Denote with  (R) = f(RjeR )=f(RjeU ).
Conditional on observing R; the beliefs of the buyer in the separating equilibrium
are given by e  R; eR ; eU  =  (R) (R) + (1   ) : (19)
Recall that buyers terminate relationships when the seller is revealed to be an unreliable
type, i.e., if  = 0. At the same time, relationships are started under prior 0:
Therefore, the fact that lim
R!0
(R) = 0 implies that there exists a threshold e  0
such that if e  R; eR ; eU   e the buyer terminates the relationship. Monotonicity
of e  R; eR ; eU  with respect to R implies the existence of a threshold eR implicitely
dened by e  R; eR ; eU  = e: If R  eR the relationship is terminated. If R > eR
the relationship continues with beliefs as in (19).
We now check that for all buyers beliefs such that eR > eU a reliable type has
indeed higher incentives to exert e¤ort. Consider the incentives of both types to
exert e¤ort. Denote with Vi
e  R; eR ; eU  the continuation values associated with
posterior beliefs e  R; eR ; eU  for a seller of type i 2 fR;Ug: Continuation values
Vi
e () only depend on the realization of R; buyers beliefs about e¤ort levels ei ,
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and  . Vi
e () is, therefore, taken as given by the seller. The sellers incentives
depend on the gains of making high R states more likely and low R states less likely:
The equilibrium requires ei = ei for each i 2 fR;Ug and eR > eU :
Each type i 2 fR;Ug choses e¤ort as follows:
ei 2 arg max
e
Z 1
0
Vi
e (R; ) f(Rje)dR   (e)  c (qm) : (20)
Denoting with Vi
e (R; ) = R 10 Vi e (R; ) df(Rjei )dei dR; the rst order condition
implies
Vi
e (R; ) =  0(ei ): (21)
Consider rst the reliable type. Since contracts are not renegotiated until the
following high season and the participation constraint of the seller is binding, the
value for a reliable type is given by
VR
e (R; ) = ( RqR w + R + 2V O if R  eRRqR p+ 2V O otherwise. (22)
For the unreliable type, instead, we have
VU
e (R; ) = (  (1  )  RqR w + R+ RqR p+ 2V O if R  eRRqR p+ 2V O otherwise.
The binding constraint (8) implies R = qR (p  w ) :Denoting (R) = VR
e (R; ) 
VU
e (R; ) ; we have  (R) > 0 if R  eR and  (R) = 0 if R < eR : Part 1)
of Assumption 3 guarantees an interior solution. The marginal benets of e¤orts are
higher for the reliable type if
R 1eR  (R) df(Rjei )dei dR > 0: The condition is satised
since  (R) > 0 and
R 1eR df(Rjei )dei dR >0 from Part 2) of Assumption 3. In partic-
ular, the Beta distribution implies that there exists R such that df(Rje
i
 )
dei
> 0 for
R R and df(Rje
i
 )
dei
< 0 for R <R : This, together with
R 1
0
df(Rjei )
dei
dR =0; impliesR 1eR df(Rjei )dei dR > 0:
The second part of the proposition compares the incentives of a reliable type at
age  and  0; with  0 > : Substituting (22) in the rst order condition (21), we obtain
qR p
Z 1
0
Rdf(Rje)
de
dR+
Z 1
eR
 RqR w  RqR p+ R df(Rje)de dR =  0(e): (23)
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Noting that
R 1
0 Rdf(Rje)de dR =
@
R 1
0 Rf(Rje)dR
@e =
1
e and using the binding constraint (8),
the rst order condition becomes
qR p
e
+bV ()Z 1eR (1 R) df(Rje)de dR =  0(e) (24)
where bV () = qR (p  w ) : If qR and bV () increase in  ; (24) implies that e¤ort
increases in  : To see why e¤ort might eventually decrease in  ; let  !1: This gives
very optimistic priors, i.e., 1 ' 1; which implies posteriors e1 ' 1 regardless of R;
i.e., lim
!1
eR = 0: The rst order condition (24) then becomes qR1w1e =  0(e) implying
a lower e¤ort level since, by the argument above, @
R 1eR (1 R) df(Rje)de dR =@ eR > 0
for eR su¢ ciently small.
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8 Online Appendix B: Data Sources
Transaction-Level Export Data
The data cover all exports of roses during the period from April 2004 to August
2009. The data are obtained from the Horticultural Crops Development Authority
(HCDA), a parastatal body which promotes and regulates the horticultural indus-
try in Kenya. Records of each export transaction are entered in close collaboration
with the Customs Authority. The invoice for each transaction is directly entered into
the database at HCDA before the owers are exported. Each invoice contains infor-
mation on name of the Kenyan exporter, name of foreign consignee/client, type of
produce, weight (kgs), units, unit value, total value, date, destination, currency and
freight clause (C&F, FOB). We restrict our sample to established exporters that export
throughout most of the season in the year preceding the violence. The sample covers
more than ninety ve percent of export records in the data.
Survey and Administrative Data
Information provided in the background section was collected through a rm-level
survey. The survey was designed in collaboration with Chris Ksoll and was imple-
mented by the authors in July to September 2008. The survey covered i) general
questions about the rm (history, farm certication, ownership structure, level of ver-
tical integration, location of farms etc.), ii) contractual relationships in export markets
and marketing channels (direct wholesaler and/or auction houses), iii) rm production
(covering detailed information on labor force, input use and assets), iv) retrospective
post-election violence period (e¤ect on operations, loss of workers by week, issues on
transportation and air-freight, nancial losses and extra-costs incurred). The survey
was administrated to the most senior person at the rm, which on most occasions was
the owner himself/herself. Upon previous appointment, face-to-face interviews of one
to two hours were conducted by the authors with the respondent.
The location of exporters in the sample is obtained from HCDA, the Kenya Flower
Council (KFC) and eld visits during the survey. The names and nationality of rms
owners and directors are obtained from the Registrar of Companies at the Attorney
Generals O¢ ce. Internet search and interviews guided the classication of foreign buy-
ers into di¤erent marketing channels. Prices and volumes at the auctions is obtained
at the weekly level from the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD/WTO, Geneva.
Time and Location of the Violence
To classify whether a location was a¤ected by the violence we rely on the Kenya
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Red Cross Societys (KRCS) Information Bulletins on the Electoral Violence which
were issued daily during the relevant period (see Kenya Red Cross Society (2008) for
details). Various other sources were used to supplement and verify the information,
including: i) Disaster Desk of the Data Exchange Platform for the Horn of Africa
(DEPHA),27 ii) Ushahidi,28 iii) the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
Report (2008), and iv) the Independent Review Commission Report (2008). Finally,
we confront this information with the responses in the rm survey. For the locations
relevant to the ower industry, the rst outbreak of violence occurred on the 29th
December 2007 and lasted until Janunary 4th 2008, around Eldoret, Kitale, Kericho
and Nakuru. The second outbreak occurred between the 25th and 30th of January 2008
and also involved the towns of Naivasha and Limuru.
27DEPHA provides geographic information data and services to the region under the UN. DEPHA
maps of the violence were accessed at http://www.depha.org/Post_election_Violence.asp on Sep-
tember 23rd; 2008.
28Ushahidi is an open-source site launched to gather information from the general public on the
events in real time. The general public could on a map of Kenya pin up a town/area where conict
had erupted and when. For details, see http://legacy.ushahidi.com/ (accessed on September 30th
2008).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Direct Relationships
Source: Authors calculations from HCDA Transaction level data on all flower exports. The sample is given by all relationships
active immediately before the violence, i.e., only relationships that had more than 20 transactions from the beginning of the
season. Left censored refers to relationships that were already active before the beginning of the period covered in the data, i.e.,
relationships that were active before September 2004.
Table 2: Relationships Age and Outcomes [TEST 1]
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between the
main relationships outcomes and two measures of the age of the relationship: number of previous shipments and past temptations,
i.e., number of previous shipments at times in which auctions prices were higher than the relationship’s price. All variables are in
logs. The outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample refers to relationships that were active during
the period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the baseline sample but were not active in the season preceding the
violence and includes relationships that did not survive until the violence season. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm
level are reported in parenthesis.
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Number of Shipments 189 60.60 35.69 20 140
Number of Stems per Week (in 1000s) 189 102.39 165.14 1.53 971.72
Av. FOB Price (Euro Cents per stem) 189 12.11 11.65 1.25 25.75
Age (in Days) 189 860.12 449.45 33 1352
Number of Previous Transactions 189 298.23 288.80 20 1128
Left Censored (Yes = 1, No =0) 189 0.44 0.49 0 1
Number of Relationships per Seller 56 3.38 2.88 1 14
Number of Relationships per Buyer 71 2.66 2.82 1 14
Maximum Q ( / average weekly Q) 189 4.52 2.59 1.02 17.56
Estimated S (/ average weekly revenues) 189 5.78 5.38 1.27 28.19
Estimated U (/ average weekly revenues) 189 3.87 4.66 0.63 24.11
Estimated V (/ average weekly revenues) 189 1.91 2.99 0.00 13.28
Panel A: Relationship Characteristics
Panel B: Number of Relationships per Buyer and Seller
Panel C: Estimated Relationship Values (Season Before the Violence)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent Variable:
0.386*** 0.431*** 0.457*** 0.484*** 0.267** 0.307** 0.761*** 0.766***
[0.074] [0.110] [0.106] [0.116] [0.122] [0.126] [0.216] [0.272]
Firm and Buyer Fixed Effects yes -- yes -- yes -- yes --
Relationship Fixed effects no yes no yes no yes no yes
Season Fixed Effects no yes no yes no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.55 0.72 0.61 0.66
Number of observations 156 444 156 444 156 444 111 444
Seller Value
Number of Past Temptations (log)
Maximum Volume Relationship Value Buyer Value
Table 3: Binding Aggregate Incentive Compatibility Constraint [TEST 2]
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between prices
at the auctions and relationships outcomes at the time of the maximum temptation to deviate. All variables are in logs. The
outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample refers to relationships that were active during the
period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the baseline sample but were not active in the season preceding the violence
and includes relationships that did not survive until the violence season. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are
reported in parenthesis.
Table 4: The Violence Reduced Exports in Direct Relationships
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports the difference in mean in
estimated reliability between direct relationships of firms located in regions directly affected by the violence against direct
relationships of firms located in regions not directly affected. Reliability is computed as the ratio of realized exports over
predicted exports during the second spike of the violence. The predicted values are obtained by fitting a relationships specific
regression of shipments in any given day of the week with shipments in the corresponding day for the previous week, taking into
account seasonality patterns. For the median relationship in the sample, this regression has an R-square equal to 0.85. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parenthesis.
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent Variable: Relationship Value Maximum Volume Price
0.115 -0.884** 0.371
[0.392] [0.392] [0.212]
Relationship Fixed effects yes yes yes
Season Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Seasonality Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.86 0.65
Number of observations 444 444 444
Price at auction (ln)
Dependent Variable: Log Reliability During
Violence [1] [2] [3] [4]
-0.173*** -0.189** -0.141*** -0.188***
[0.066] [0.074] [0.050] [0.078]
Relationship Controls no yes yes yes
Seller Controls no no yes yes
Buyer Fixed Effects no no no yes
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.56
Number of observations 189 189 189 189
Conflict Region
Table 5: Relationship’s Age and Reliability [TEST 3]
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between
measures of the age of the relationship and reliability at the time of the violence. Reliability is computed as in Table 4. All
variables are in logs. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parenthesis.
Table 6: Reliability and Relationship’s Death [TEST 3]
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table shows that the violence has
destroyed relationships for which reliability at the time of the violence was sufficiently low. No relationship exists between
reliability and relationship survival in regions not affected by the violence. Reliability is computed as in Table 4. The sample is
given by all relationships active immediately before the violence. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively. The sample is given by the set of surviving relationships in the season after the violence. Regressions controls
include volumes, prices and frequency of transactions in the period before the violence. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. Firm controls include size, number of relationships, and share of exports to direct relationships. Bootstrapped
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
0.193* 0.535*** 0.086 0.273
[0.118] [0.140] [0.1827] [0.473]
-0.050* -0.027
[0.025] [0.054]
Seller Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Buyer Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Relationship Controls yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.88 0.74 0.75
Number of observations 95 95 94 94
Conflict Region No Conflict Region
Past Temptations (log)
Past Temptations (log) Squared
Dependent Variable: Log Reliability During
Violence
[1] [2] [3] [4]
-0.321*** -0.271*** -0.019 -0.093
[0.103] [0.085] [0.044] [0.111]
0.036 0.064 -0.022 0.048
[0.038] [0.047] [0.041] [0.146]
Seller Controls no yes no yes
Buyer Fixed Effects no yes no yes
Relationship Controls yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 95 95 94 94
Dependent Variable: Relationship's Death
Conflict Region No Conflict Region
Past Temptations (log)
Reliability, Log
Table 7: Reliability, Age and Future Relationship Outcomes [TEST 3]
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The sample is given by the set of surviving
relationships in the season after the violence. Reliability is computed as in Table 4. Regressions controls include volumes, prices
and frequency of transactions in the period before the violence. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent Variable: Maximum Volume Relationship Value Buyer Value Seller Value
3.705** 3.819*** 4.750*** 11.260*
[1.555] [1.200] [1.529] [6.021]
0.773** 0.819*** 1.031*** -0.799
[0.295] [0.261] [0.249] [0.692]
-1.125*** -1.181*** -1.526*** -2.145*
[0.389] [0.322] [0.358] [1.144]
Number of Observations 79 79 79 58
-0.787 -0.616 0.088 -4.261
[1.533] [1.416] [1.862] [7.198]
-0.261 -0.232 -0.099 -1.647
[0.439] [0.414] [0.487] [2.301]
0.447 0.399 0.193 0.827
[0.443] [0.420] [0.500] [2.137]
Number of Observations 85 85 85 62
Relationship Controls yes yes yes yes
Seller Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Buyer Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Reliability at Time of Violence X
Past Temptations
Past Temptations
Past Temptations
Panel A:Conflict Region
Panel B: No-Conflict Region
Reliability at Time of Violence X
Past Temptations
Reliability at Time of Violence
Reliability at Time of Violence
Table A1: The Violence, Self-Reported Records
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports the difference in mean in
responses between firms located in regions directly affected by the violence and firms located in regions not directly affected by
the violence respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in parenthesis.
Table A2: Effort at Time of Violence: Retaining Workers at the Farm
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports correlations between the
percentage of workers lost and the marketing channels used by the firm. The Table is taken from Ksoll et al. (2011). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in parenthesis.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent Variable:
Did Violence Affect
at all the Operations
of Your Firm?
Were there any days
in which members of
your staff did not
come to work because
of the Violence?
What was the highest
proportion of Workers
Absent due to the
Violence?
To What Extent did
Worker Absence
Cause a Loss in
Production?
Did you Experience
Any Transportation
Problem to Ship
Flowers to the
Airport?
Did you Hire Extra
Secuirty?
0.575*** 0.702*** 43.898*** 2.333*** 0.477*** 0.311***
[0.103] [0.072] [5.609] [0.124] [0.100] [0.099]
Dep. Var. in No-Conflict
Region (Mean)
0.333 0.206 1.511 0.167 0.233 0.071
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.51 0.35 0.55 0.136 0.116
Number of Firms 74 74 74 74 74 74
Conflict Region (yes=1)
Dependent Variable: % Workers Lost (1) (2) (3) (4)
25.45** 32.47** 30.01** 27.09**
[12.08] [13.47] [13.81] [12.13]
10.11 12.42
[11.21] [15.12]
-2.71* -4.19**
[1.43] [2.1]
Firm Controls no yes no yes
Location Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Observations (firms) 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.282 0.352 0.401 0.394
Only Auction (yes=1)
Firms Using Both Channels (yes=1)
Estimated Total Value of Direct Relationships
Table A3: Effort at Time of Violence: No Sales to Auctions
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The Table reports the difference in mean in
estimated reliability between direct relationships and auctions for firms located in regions directly affected by the violence and
firms located in regions not directly affected by the violence. Only direct relationship takes value equal to one if the firm exports
more than ninety percent of its produce to direct relationships. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at the firm and buyer
level, are reported in parenthesis.
Table A4: Unit Weights Placebos
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered at
the firm and buyer level, are reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: Reliability at Time of Violence [1] [2] [3]
-0.865*** -0.175*
[0.082] [0.096]
-0.088 0.023
[0.103] [0.095]
0.650** 0.512*
[0.312] [0.271]
0.008
[0.113]
-0.473**
[0.239]
Relationship Controls no no yes
Firm Fixed Effects no yes no
Direct Relationships Only no no yes
Number of observations 274 274 189
Only Direct Relationships [yes = 1] X Conflict Region
Only Direct Relationships [yes = 1]
Direct Relationship X Conflict Region
Direct Relationship
Conflict Region
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent Variable:
0.006 0.011 0.024 -0.002
[0.067] [0.045] [0.037] [0.051]
0.022 -0.023
[0.053] [0.021]
Firm Fixed Effects yes -- yes yes -- yes
Buyer Fixed Effects yes -- no yes -- no
Relationship Fixed effects no yes no no yes no
Season Fixed Effects -- yes -- -- yes --
Number of observations 146 444 274 146 444 274
Unit Weight: Standard DeviationUnit Weight: Average
Past Temptations
Direct Relationship
Figure 1: Conflict and No-Conflict Regions
Among the towns around which flower firms are located, the Figure illustrates those locations that were directly affected by the
violence to the left of the red line and those locations that were not affected by the violence to the right.
Figure 2: Effect of Violence on Export Volumes
The figure shows the median biweekly residual of a regression that controls for firm specific seasonality and growth patterns in
conflict and in non-conflict locations for the 10 weeks before and 10 weeks after the first outbreak of violence. For data sources,
please refer to the online Appendix.
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Figure 3: Seasonal Fluctuations in Auction Prices are Predictable
The Figure shows that FOB Prices at the Auctions are highly predictable. A regression of the weekly price at the auction on week
and season dummies explains 76% of the variation in prices in the three season preceding the violence period. A season begins in
mid-August. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
Figure 4: Fluctuations in Prices, Direct Relationships vs. Auction
The Figure shows that FOB Prices in direct relationships are more stable than prices at the auctions throughout the season. The
Figure shows the weekly variation relative to the season mean of FOB prices in direct relationships and at the Auctions. The FOB
prices in direct relationships are obtained as week dummies in a regression of FOB prices on relationship fixed effects on the
corresponding season. A season begins in mid-August. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Highest Temptation Weeks
The Figure shows the distribution of the calendar weeks in which the maximum temptation to deviate occur. The sample is given
by all the relationships active in the season 2006/07, as in columns 1,3,5,7 of Table 2. The temptation to deviate is the value at the
auctions of quantities traded in a relationship in a week. In a given season, the maximum temptation to deviate is given by the
highest temptation to deviate during the season. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
Figure 6: Surviving Relationships Afford Higher Aggregate Temptations
The Figure shows the distribution of the (log of the) value of relationships in the season 2006/07. The value is given by the
maximum temptation to deviate. The temptation to deviate is the value at the auctions of quantities traded in a relationship in a
week. In a given season, the maximum temptation to deviate is given by the highest temptation to deviate during the season.
Among the relationships in our baseline sample, i.e., those active immediately before the violence period, relationships that were
already active before 2006/07 are depicted with a straight line, new relationships with a dashed line, and relationships that were
active in 2006/07 but did not survive with thicker dots. The Figure shows that relationships with higher values are more likely to
survive. The equality of mean (and distribution) between surviving and dying relationships is rejected with 1% confidence
interval. New relationships also have lower values. The equality of mean (and distribution) between new and established
relationships is rejected with 1% confidence interval. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
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Figure 7: Separations Do Not Occur when Auction Prices are High
The Figure shows that the number of relationships dying in a given week does not correlate with the price at the Auctions in that
week during the two season preceding the violence period. This is consistent with the fact that prices at the auctions are highly
predictable. In a regression of the number of relationships dying in a given week that controls for week and season dummies, the
coefficient on the violence period is positive and significant. The R-square for the same regression is 0.57. Regardless of whether
week dummies are controlled for or not, the level of prices at the auctions does not predict the number of relationships dying. For
data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
.5
1
1.
5
2
Au
ct
io
n
Pr
ic
es
0
1
2
3
4
5
N
um
be
ro
fR
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
E
nd
in
g
0 20 40 60 80 100
Weeks, Season 2006/07 and 2007/08
Number of Relationships Ending Violence Period
Auction Prices (Relative to Season Average)
Figure A1: FOB Prices at the Time of the Violence: Auctions vs. Direct Relationships
The Figure shows the distribution of average FOB prices per stem in direct relationships at the time of the violence. The two
vertical lines show the average prices of small and large stems of roses at the Dutch auctions at the time of the violence. The
figure shows that most relationships paid prices lower than at the spot market. (Source: authors calculations from HCDA Data and
Auctions Data).
Figure A2: No Renegotiation of FOB Prices at the Time of the Violence
The Figure shows the distribution of average FOB prices per stem in direct relationships at the time of the violence and in the
control period, i.e., the ten weeks prior to the violence. The two vertical lines show average FOB prices at the time of the violence
and in the control period. The figure shows that prices were not renegotiated at the time of the violence.
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